We argue that open system arguments fail for two related reasons; 1) because they cannot account for the "systems" central to their argument (nor the implied systems labeled "exogenous factors" in relation to the system of interest) and 2) they are nomocentric, fixated on laws while ignoring initial and antecedent conditions that are able to account for systems and exogenous factors within a fundamentalist framework.
work differs from other critiques of open system arguments against laws of nature by not focusing on laws themselves, but rather on the inference from open systems. We argue that open system arguments fail for two related reasons; 1) because they cannot account for the "systems" central to their argument (nor the implied systems labeled "exogenous factors" in relation to the system of interest) and 2) they are nomocentric, fixated on laws while ignoring initial and antecedent conditions that are able to account for systems and exogenous factors within a fundamentalist framework. __________________________________________________________ 1. Introduction. This article attacks the argument that because universal laws are not generally observed in the real world of open systems we should be highly skeptical of their universality. This argument is especially associated with Nancy Cartwright, who has branded the belief in universal laws of nature as "fundamentalist" and whose work especially has attracted numerous counterarguments (e.g., Kline and Matheson 1986 , Poland 1994 , Anderson 2001 , Sklar 2003 , Spurrett 2001 , Hoefer 2003 , Psillos 2006 . For the sake of brevity we will focus primarily on Cartwright's work). However, her arguments have been resilient; in a 1999 article Earman and Roberts even profess that they "do not know how to begin to assess Cartwright's claim about contextspecific factors that in principle elude theoretical treatment" (456).
Crucially, however, most of the critiques of open system arguments (including more recent critiques) are focused on laws themselves in one way or another. 1 We find these attacks limited in their effectiveness;
while they do support a faith in "fundamentalism," they do not strike at we temporarily see constant conjunctions it is only because of human 1 Other critiques also focus on the inference by many open-systemists from antifundamentalism to "natures," "tendencies," or "capacities," which we do not discuss here. If correct, our argument preempts this inference.
2 Some of the points briefly raised in Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002 come closest to our argument. They criticize Lange 1993 , who presents an argument on 'provisos' similar to the position of Cartwright, for inattention to boundary conditions (Earman, Roberts, and Smith 2002, 284) and argue that Cartwright confuses laws and differential equations of motion while neglecting initial conditions (286 and endnote 5). Otherwise, to our knowledge there has been little sustained attention to the importance of initial
conditions to the open system argument. Bhaskar 1975 does discuss initial conditions towards its conclusion (236-237), however, by that point the discussion is entirely within terms of his 'transcendental realist' argument. Cartwright mentions initial conditions in scattered remarks; again we find no passage that clearly addresses our concerns. A point similar to part of our argument on systems is made by Ruphy (2003) , particularly when she asks Cartwright how theoretical domains are to be divided into "bits and pieces" (61 Open system arguments generally reject this approach on the grounds that it is caught in the twin horns of a dilemma. The first horn is that there is no principled way from within a theory to know what to control for to get a law -we would in effect need more general laws or theories to justify the external conditions we impose on an experiment for it to create constant conjunction outcomes. For example, Cartwright states "My conclusion … is that we need to add to the basic 'equations of motion', like F=ma or Schrödinger's equation, a special constraining condition: The equation holds so long as everything that can affect the targeted effect is describable in the theory" (Cartwright 2002a, 432-433;  emphasis added. See also Bhaskar 1975, 12-13) and:
All that is law-like on the Humean picture are associations between measurable quantities. That's it. The only way a condition could restrict the range of an association in a principled or nomological way would be via a more complex law…The effect of this is to move the conditioning factor C inside the scope of the law… (Cartwright 1999, 138) As Cartwright continues, it is clear that she is saying that the irregularities we see in the real world must, for the fundamentalist, somehow be subsumed under more general laws: The "account of laws as regularities goes naturally with a covering law theory of prediction and explanation. One set of regularities -the more concrete or phenomenological -is explained by deducing them from another set of regularities -the more general and fundamental" (Cartwright 1999, 138 ).
The second horn of the dilemma, because of its obvious nature more often implied that stated, is that the idea that there can be regularities explaining regularities in an infinite regress ("turtles all the way down") is illogical. For example, Cartwright states that "As I urged in chapter 4, the alternative theory of explanation in terms of natures rejects the covering law account. You can not have regularities 'all the way down'" (Cartwright 1999, 138 ; emphasis added). (QM, perhaps) . This is an awfully big thing to take on faith, Cartwright thinks. (Hoefer 2003 (Hoefer , 1406  emphasis added)
In the words of Cartwright:
Many will continue to feel that the wind and other exogenous factors must produce a force…That view begs the question.
When we have a good-fitting molecular model for the wind, and we have in our theory (either by composition from old principles or by the admission of new principles) systematic rules that assign force functions to the models, and the force functions assigned predict exactly the right motions, then we will have good scientific reason to maintain that the wind operates via a force. Otherwise the assumption is another expression of fundamentalist faith. (Cartwright 1999, 28) This idea that we explain through subsuming deviations from laws under more general laws is not unique to Cartwright, indeed it is widespread.
According to Halonen and Hintikka, "It seems to be generally believed among philosophers that to explain something is to subsume it under a generalization" (2005, 57) . But why should the wind be a force to be part of our explanation?
'Air' -i.e. atoms of nitrogen, oxygen, argon etc. -does seem to behave according to something like laws of nature (e.g., gas laws). But 'wind' -i.e. variations in the real-world temperatures and pressures and thus flow of masses of air -is a condition of spatiotemporal irregularities in a particular part of the universe. The question of "wind" is not one of laws, but of how such irregularities in the Earth's air came to be.
Crucially, this is where initial conditions play an indispensable but frequently ignored role. As we will show below, they are crucial for understanding where the irregularities of the universe come from.
Irregularities, in turn, are crucial to the concept of "system," compelling both the anthropocentric idealization of "systems" (such as a banknote falling in a city plaza) and their arbitrarily demarcated "exogenous" factors (such as separating the "wind" from the "system" of a city square). Our position boils down to the argument that through using laws with initial conditions we can in essence "explain the wind" (that is, we can account for the irregularities in the universe) which is in turn tantamount to explaining what humans perceive of as systems and their exogenous factors. We will first consider in the next section how initial and antecedent conditions account for the irregularities in the universe.
In Section 4 we then discuss how irregularities account for what humans perceive as 'exogenous factors' and "systems." has criticized it on grounds that it gives prominence to initial conditions" (1999, 20n) . The problem, which we believe in part has led to the acceptance of (or at least the failure to reject) open-system arguments, is not that initial conditions have not been criticized in discussions of explanation, but that they have received so little attention at all.
Extended discussions of laws far outnumber extended discussions of initial conditions or the related concepts of antecedent and boundary conditions. A search in the Philosopher's Index for entries with the term "laws of nature" in the title finds 124, against only two with the term "initial conditions," a ratio of over sixty to one. If we add the terms "laws of physics" on the one hand, and "antecedent conditions" and "boundary conditions" on the other, and include both the singular and plural forms, the ratio is still 209:4 for titles and 562:103 for abstracts. 4 Wilson (1991) , discussing boundary conditions, summarizes his view of the level of attention to initial conditions vis-à-vis laws: "[T]he standard philosophy text says virtually nothing about boundary conditions -they are scarcely mentioned before they are packed off in an undifferentiated crate labeled 'initial and boundary conditions' (usually pronounced as one word). The salient fact about 'initialandboundaryconditions' is that, whatever else they may be, they
are not laws and can be safely ignored" (Wilson 1991, 565) . pursuing, but we will not do so here" (1999, 20) .
verifying earlier theories of inflation that predict effects from primordial fluctuations in ways set forth by Albrecht (1996; and contra Earman and Mosterin 1999) . These increasingly well-supported theories show how primordial quantum fluctuations were vastly magnified through inflation, and then magnified still further through acoustic oscillations (Whittle 2004 ). This left a spatial imprint in dark matter leading after recombination to the eventual spatial pattern of condensation of early stars and galaxies. Quite simply, we are beginning to understand the development from the true initial conditions of the universe to the current vast and intricate irregularities of the universe.
Just as quantum cosmologists are beginning to understand the development from initial quantum inhomogeneities to cosmological irregularities, the special sciences have integrated those irregularities into their understanding and explanation in their areas of interest. As noted above, the irregularities imprinted on dark matter, and subsequently on matter, allowed for the condensation of galaxies and early stars. These early conditions were the antecedent conditions for later galaxy and second and third generation (our sun) star formation, with the fate of every star (i.e., becoming helium white dwarfs, carbon/oxygen white dwarfs, supergiants etc.) depending on its initial mass. Each generation contributed to the ever greater proportions of higher elements in the universe through stellar nucleosynthesis, giving the higher elements up to iron, with supernovae giving us the still higher elements. These early processes led to the precise antecedent masses, material composition, velocities, and trajectories of our early solar system and the precise eventual series of collisions and accretion that led to the Earth's distinctive structure. Planetary scientists are beginning to understand how the exact sequence of accretion of the Earth led to critical aspects, such as its large percentage of water (Morbidelli et. al., 2000; Drake and Righter 2002) and how the oblique-angled catastrophic origin of our moon accounts not only for the Earth's unique spin-axis inclinations crucial to our seasons and tides crucial to evolution, but possibly even for the unique plate tectonic activity of the Earth that is responsible for its remarkable diversity compared to other planets (Hoffman 2001a (Hoffman , 2001b importance were always settled in isolated systems" (Zurek 2003, 717) .
Similarly
In classical physics, the environment is usually viewed as a kind of disturbance, or noise, that perturbs the system under consideration in such a way as to negatively influence the study of its "objective" properties. Therefore science has established the idealization of isolated systems, with experimental physics aiming at eliminating any outer sources of disturbance as much as possible in order to discover the "true" underlying nature of the system under study. (Schlosshauer 2004 (Schlosshauer , 1273 The similarity between the emphasis on the failure of closed systems to provide a useful picture of the universe by open-systemists and in the decoherence program is striking. 6 The study of quantum-to-classical transitions with an emphasis on their ubiquity in our universe of open systems. Systems can be caused to decohere by outside interference as faint as radiation from the Cosmic Microwave Background (Zurek 1991 (Zurek 1998 (Zurek , 1818 . Similarly, Schlosshauer writes:
[T]he assumption of a decomposition of the universe into subsystems-as necessary as it appears to be for the emergence of the measurement problem and for the definition of the decoherence program-is definitely nontrivial. By definition, the universe as a whole is a closed system, and therefore there are no "unobserved degrees of freedom" of an external environment which would allow for the application of the theory of decoherence to determine the space of quasiclassical observables of the universe in its entirety. Also, there exists no general criterion for how the total Hilbert space is to be divided into subsystems, while at the same time much of what is called a property of the system will depend on its correlation with other systems. This problem becomes particularly acute if one would like decoherence not only to motivate explanations for the subjective perception of classicality…but moreover to allow for the definition of quasiclassical "macrofacts." (Schlosshauer 2004 (Schlosshauer , 1274 Open system anti-fundamentalist arguments face the same problem, viz. Barvinsky et al 1999; Lombardo 2005 .)
The term "system" is well-known for being difficult to define (see Marchal 1975) , indeed there is no universally agreed upon definition. A closely related and equally problematic term is "structure." For example Shapiro (1997) defines structure in terms of systems: structure is "the abstract form of a system, highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system" (74); he later remarks that "What is structure from one perspective is system from another" (94).
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Whatever their precise relation, the concepts of (physical) system and structure share the same fundamental problem: The universe as a whole is a system or structure, yet there is no non-arbitrary way to divide the universe into subsystems or smaller structures. Crucially, our divisions seem merely to reflect our anthropocentric perspective, pragmatic goals, and cognitive needs. We see (or create) groups of 7 Open-systemists also use the terms interchangeably, e.g. in reference to economics and its "concepts" (law-like regularities) Cartwright states that: "nothing follows from the concepts themselves without embedding them in a structure, and only special structures [i.e. "nomological machines"] will yield any deductive consequences at all" (2002b, 147).
objects acting in some way and idealize them as a system -a machine, a government, a galaxy, a solar system, a planet, an ecosystem -in order to understand their properties that interest us. But the boundary conditions that define these systems (or structures) are idealized by humans. There may well be steep changes in matter densities, types, or other properties that form apparently natural boundaries and define a system (as in a solar system), but these are never complete; idealized systems are in the end open. A paradigmatic example might be the idealization of our sun and its planets as a solar system but our later understanding that this is more open than we expected, with the Oort Cloud spawning comets reaching the interior of the system from influences as distant as passing stars and interstellar molecular clouds.
Because there never seems to be true closure in the universe, the problem with all subsystems becomes one of boundary conditions regressing to the true initial conditions of the universe. This is a problem even in our most abstract theoretical concept of system/structure, much [1975, [68] [69] but does not develop a defense against it).
As we saw in Section 4, quantum cosmology has begun to explain how primordial inhomogeneities led to the later inhomogeneities of our universe. We propose that it is these inhomogeneities (and their subsequent interactions) that motivate our idealizations of systems and structures. This is evident in the way these concepts are defined in terms of entities that occupy space, that is to say, spatial irregularities (i.e.
"objects" and "components"). For example, "system" "implies an interconnected complex of functionally related components" (Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff 1957, 7) and " [a] system is a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes" (Hall and Fagen 1956, 18) . Even in the most abstract approach to the concept of system and structure, mathematics, these are defined in spatial terms. A system is "a collection of objects with certain relations" (Carter 2005 , 293, summarizing Shapiro 1997 ) and a structure is "a collection of places with relations and/or functions defined on those places" (Carter 2005 , 305, summarizing Resnik 1997 . Indeed, if we could somehow imagine a perfectly homogenous universe it would seem impossible to imagine how systems/structures might exist. There would be no components or objects to interact with one another. Crucially, it is the development from primordial irregularities of the later irregularities in the universe that gives us "objects" and "components" that can interact and which we idealize as systems or structures. Open system anti-fundamentalist arguments are silent on this issue. The fundamentalist approach (with initial conditions), however, is both theoretically and increasingly empirically successful in accounting for the irregularities that form the basis for human conceptions of system/structure. and laypersons alike about the universe and our world initial conditions are in a sense significantly more important than laws, because while laws constrain, it is initial conditions that account for the initial variation and subsequent rich and beautiful complexity in the universe. were, on which to apply our climbing toolkit of laws, allowing the descent to the concrete situations we want to explain. Furthermore, the irregularities that can be traced to initial conditions account for the anthropocentric perception of systems and their exogenous factors. Open system arguments, however, are tellingly silent on the ontology and origins of "systems" -the very basis of their argument.
Why Initial Conditions
Overall, humans seem to have a deep desire to see causal relations between the emergent irregularities ("systems," "structures," "objects,"
"components") of the universe, and thus we look for non-existent constant conjunctions between these. We agree with open-systemists such as Bhaskar and Cartwright that these do not exist, and that this is a highly significant fact. But the empirically supported interpretation of this fact is that the macro relations that we do see are spatiotemporal trends, trends that ultimately stem from irregular micro initial conditions in a universe with universal laws.
Interestingly, the primordial onset of ubiquitous decoherence suggests that the significance of quantum indeterminacy to explanation in our quasiclassical universe may need to be reconsidered. Quantum indeterminacy may yet be understood to define much of what our classical universe is like. But not through undermining universal laws and introducing ontological chance directly into the post-inflationary universe, but rather through primordial vacuum fluctuations providing the universe with irregular initial conditions, and thus transmitting the contingency of quantum phenomena throughout the universe by way of the spacetime trajectories of matter.
Addendum. The open system rejection of laws of nature brings to mind a problem recently pointed out with an idealized Newtonian universe.
McAllister (1999 and 2004) shows that a Newtonian universe is inconsistent. The traditional conception of a Newtonian universe is that it is governed by laws and initial conditions, and consistent with the D-N model of explanation (McAllister 1999, 327-328) . If we want to explain, say, the motion of a body in a solar system within a Newtonian universe we would consider the laws of motion in that universe, along with the initial velocities, trajectories and masses of the bodies in the solar system. However, the inconsistency that McAllister points out is that there is no way to introduce initial conditions into a Newtonian universe.
These would be, in effect, a set of impermissible exogenous factors in what is by definition an isolated system. Thus one must posit laws that explain the solar system in question; this regresses infinitely, so there can never be any initial conditions in a Newtonian universe. Ergo, it must have no initial conditions, and be defined only by laws.
However, as McAllister notes, he is only pointing out an inconsistency in our concept of an idealized Newtonian universe (2004, 203) ; this critique does not apply to our universe because it seems to have a beginning, the Big Bang. In our universe there are initial conditions as well as regularities (that may be universal laws of nature), thus our real world does not fall into the paradox he points out for a Newtonian universe. Cartwright's claim that "[t]he only way a condition could restrict the range of an association in a principled or nomological way would be via a more complex law" (Cartwright 1999, 138 ) is like
McAllister's observation of the inconsistency of a Newtonian universe that can only have laws. But just as we can immediately see that this inconsistency most likely does not apply to our universe because it has initial conditions, so too we can see how easily open system objections are resolved by initial conditions. The crucial question is not whether the open-systems view is more compelling than a scientific attempt to account for the complexity of our universe through laws "all the way down," but whether it is more compelling than a scientific attempt to explain the complexities of our universe with laws and initial conditions. . This is beyond the scope of our discussion. However, it is possible that laws, constants, and initial conditions of the universe may simply have to be accepted as "brute facts" (see Callender 2004 ).
